Recent studies suggest that social media usage -while linked to an increased diversity of information and perspectives for users -has exacerbated user polarization on many issues. A popular theory for this phenomenon centers on the concept of " lter bubbles": by automatically recommending content that a user is likely to agree with, social network algorithms create echo chambers of similarly-minded users that would not have arisen otherwise [54] . However, while echo chambers have been observed in real-world networks, the evidence for lter bubbles is largely post-hoc.
Introduction
In the middle and right networks, we introduce a network administrator who is allowed to make small changes to the network, and is incentivized to connect users with content that is similar to their opinion. After reweighting edges by just a small amount (i.e. ltering social content), the network administrator's actions increase a standard measure of opinion polarization in these graphs by 180% and 260%, respectively. This illustrates the formation of a " lter bubble" in the network.
Filter bubbles
An in uential idea put forward by Eli Pariser suggests an important mechanism for explaining why social media increases societal polarization [54] . According to Pariser, preferential attention to viewpoints similar to those already held by an individual is explicitly encouraged by social media companies: to increase metrics like engagement and ad revenue, recommendation systems tend to connect users with information already similar to their current beliefs.
Such recommendations can be direct: friend or follow suggestions on platforms like Facebook or Twitter. Or they can be more subtle: chronological "news feeds" on social media have universally been replaced with individually ltered and sorted feeds which connect users with posts that they are most likely to engage with [29] . By recommending such content, social network companies create "echo chambers" of similar-minded users. Owing to their root cause -the external ltering of content shown to a user -Pariser called these echo chambers lter bubbles.
The danger of lter bubbles was recently highlighted by Apple CEO Tim Cook in a commencement speech at Tulane University [27] . Filter bubbles have been blamed for the spread of fake news during the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election [42] , protests against immigration in Europe [34] , and even measles outbreaks in 2014 and 2015 [40] . In each of these incidents, instead of bringing diverse groups of users together, social media has reinforced di erences between groups and wedged them apart.
At least... that's the theory. While Pariser's ideas make logical sense, the magnitude of the " lter bubble e ect" has been disputed or questioned for lack of evidence [7, 14, 41, 53, 61, 64 ].
Our contributions
The goal of this paper is to better understand lter bubbles, and ultimately, to place Pariser's theory on rmer ground. We do so by developing a mathematical framework for studying the e ect of lter bubbles on polarization in social networks, relying on well-established analytical models for opinion dynamics [22] .
Such models provide simple rules that capture how opinions form and propagate in a social network. The network itself is typically modeled as a weighted graph: nodes are individuals and social connections are represented by edges, with higher weight for relationships with increased interaction. We work speci cally with the well-studied Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model, which models an individual's opinion on an issue as a continuous value between -1 and 1, and assumes that, as time progresses, individuals update their opinions based on the average opinion of their social connections [31] . The Friedkin-Johnsen model has been used successfully to study polarization in social networks [11, 18, 19, 52] .
Our contribution is to modify the model by adding an external force: a network administrator who lters social interaction between users. Based on modern recommendation systems [4] , the network administrator makes small changes to edge weights in the network, which correspond to slightly increasing or decreasing interaction between speci c individuals (e.g. by tuning a news feed algorithm). The administrator's goal is to connect users with content they likely agree with, and therefore increase user engagement. Formally, we model this goal by assuming that the network administrator seeks to minimize a standard measure of disagreement in the social network. As individuals update their opinions according to the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, the administrator repeatedly adjusts the underlying network graph to achieve its own goal.
Using our model, we establish a number of experimental and theoretical results which suggest that content ltering by a network administrator can signi cantly increase polarization, even when changes to the network are highly constrained (and perhaps unnoticeable by users). First, we apply our augmented opinion dynamics model to real-world social networks obtained from Twitter and Reddit. When the network administrator changes only 40% of the total edge weight in the network, polarization increases by more than a factor of 40×. These results are striking-they suggest that social networks are very sensitive to in uence by ltering. As illustrated in Figure 1 , even minor content ltering by the network administrator can create signi cant " lter bubbles", just as Pariser predicted [54] .
Next, to better understand the sensitivity of social networks to ltering, we study a standard generative model for social networks: the stochastic block model [1] . We show that, with high probability, any network generated from the stochastic block model is in a state of fragile consensus: that is, under the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, the network will exhibit low polarization, but can become highly polarized after only a minor adjustment of edge weights. Our ndings give theoretical justi cation for why a network administrator can greatly increase polarization in real-world networks.
Finally, ending on an optimistic note, we show experimentally that a simple modi cation to the incentives of the network administrator can greatly mitigate the lter bubble e ect. Surprisingly, our proposed solution also minimally a ects the incentives of the network administrator-its objective, user disagreement, is only increased by at most 5%.
Prior work
Minimizing polarization in social networks. There has been a substantial amount of recent work which uses opinion dynamics models to study polarization in social networks. [49] rst de nes polarization in the Friedkin-Johnsen model, and gives an algorithm for reducing polarization in social networks. [52] and [18] give methods for nding network structures which minimize di erent functions involving polarization and disagreement in the Friedkin-Johnsen model. Our work di ers from this prior work in that we study network modi cations which increase polarization, rather than decreasing it. Moreover, we study how such modi cations arise even when the network administrator is not explicitly incentivized to change polarization.
Other opinion dynamics models and metrics have also been used to study network polarization. [5] gives an algorithm for mitigating lter bubbles in an in uence maximization setting. [33] studies "controversy" in the Friedkin-Johnsen model, a metric related to polarization, and [32] gives an algorithm for reducing controversy in networks.
Modeling lter bubbles and recommendation systems. Biased assimilation, which is when users gravitate towards viewpoints similar to their own, has been argued as one cause of increased polarization in social networks. By generalizing the classic DeGroot model [25] of opinion formation, [21] provides theoretical support for the biased assimilation phenomenon and analyzes the interaction of three recommendation systems on biased assimilation. [26] models biased assimilation in social networks using a variant of the Bounded Con dence Model (BCM) [37] , an opinion dynamics model that does not assume a latent graph structure between users. Most similar to our work, [34] creates a variant of the BCM that models biased assimilation, homophily, and algorithmic ltering, and shows how echo chambers can arise as a result of these factors. [17] studies the more general problem of how recommendation systems increase homogeneity of user behavior.
Notation and Preliminaries
We use bold letters to denote vectors, e.g. a. The i th entry of a is denoted a i . For a matrix A, A ij is the entry in the i th row and j th column. For a vector a ∈ R n , let diag(a) return an n × n diagonal matrix with the i th diagonal entry equal to a i . For a matrix A ∈ R n×d , let rowsum(A) return a vector whose i th entry is equal to the sum of all entries in A's i th row. We use I n×n to denote a dimension n identity matrix, and 1 n to denote the all ones column vector, with the subscript omitted when dimension is clear from context. Every real symmetric matrix A ∈ R n×n has an orthogonal eigendecomposition A = U ΛU T where U ∈ R n×n is orthonormal (i.e U T U = UU T = I ) and Λ is diagonal, with real valued entries λ 1 ≤ λ 2 ≤ . . . ≤ λ n equal to A's eigenvalues. We say a symmetric matrix is positive semide nite (PSD) is all of its eigenvalues are non-negative (i.e. λ 1 ≥ 0). We use to denote the standard Loewner ordering: M N indicates that N -M is PSD. For a square matrix M, M 2 denotes the spectral norm of M and M F denotes the Frobenius norm. For a vector v, ||v|| 2 denotes the L 2 norm.
Road Map
Section 2 Introduce preliminaries on Freidkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics, which form a basis for modeling lter bubbles. Section 3 Introduce our central "network administrator dynamics" and establish experimentally that content ltering can signi cantly increase polarization in social networks. Section 4 Explore these ndings theoretically by showing that stochastic block model graphs exhibit a "fragile consensus" which is easily disrupted by outside in uence.
Section 5 Discuss a small modi cation to the content ltering process that can mitigate the e ect of lter bubbles while still being bene cial for the network administrator.
Section 6 Brie y discuss future directions of study.
Modeling Opinion Formation
One productive approach towards understanding the dynamics of consensus and polarization in social networks has been to develop simple mathematical models to explain how information and ideas spread in these networks.
While there are a variety of models in the literature, we use the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model, which has been used to study polarization in recent work [18, 49, 52] .
Friedkin-Johnsen Dynamics
Concretely, the Friedkin-Johnsen (FJ) dynamics applies to any social network that can be modeled as an undirected, weighted graph G. Let {v 1 , . . . , v n } denote G's nodes and for all i = j, let w ij ≥ 0 denote the weight of undirected edge (i, j) between nodes v i and v j . Let d i = j =i w ij be the degree of node v i .
The FJ dynamics model the propagation of an opinion on an issue during a discrete set of time steps t ∈ 0, 1, . . . , T . The issue may be speci c (Do you believe that humans contribute to climate change?) or it may encode a broad ideology (Do your political views align most with conservative or liberal politicians in the US?).
In either case, the FJ dynamics assume that the issue has exactly two poles, with an individual In addition to an innate opinion, for every time t, each node is associated with an "expressed" or "current" opinion
, which changes over time. Speci cally, the FJ dynamics evolves according to the update rule:
That is, at each time step, each node adopts a new expressed opinion which is the average of its own innate opinion and the opinion of its neighbors. For a given graph G and innate opinion vector s, it is well known that the FJ dynamics converges to an equilibrium set of opinions [11] , which we denote
It will be helpful to express the FJ dynamics in a linear algebraic way. Let A ∈ R n×n be the adjacency matrix of G, with A ij = A ji = w ij and let D be a diagonal matrix with
where we denote
n ]. From this expression, it is not hard to check that
Alternative Models. The Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model is a variation of DeGroot's classical model for consensus formation in social network [25] . The distinguishing characteristic of the FJ model is the addition of the innate opinions encoded in s. Unlike the DeGroot model, which always converges in a consensus when G is connected (i.e., z * i = z * j for all i, j) , innate opinions allow for a richer set of equilibrium opinions. In particular, z * will typically contain opinions ranging continuously between -1 and 1.
Compared to DeGroot, the FJ dynamics more accurately model a world where an individual's opinion (e.g. on a political issue) is not shaped solely by social in uence, but also by an individual's particular background, beliefs, or life circumstances.
FJ dynamics are often studied in economics and game theory as an example of a game with price of anarchy greater than one [11] . Other variations on the model include additional variables [38] , for example, allowing the "stubbornness" of an individual to vary [2, 19] , or adding additional terms to Equation (1) that indicate when an individual cares about the average network opinion as well as their neighbors' opinions [28] .
There also exist many models for opinion formation that fall outside of DeGroot's original framework. Several models involve discrete instead of continuously valued opinions. We refer to reader to the overview and discussion of di erent proposals in [22] . In this paper, we focus on the original FJ dynamics, which are already rich enough to provide several interesting insights on the dynamics of polarization, lter bubbles, and echo chambers.
Polarization, Disagreement, and Internal Con ict
The fact that z * does not always contain a single consensus opinion makes the FJ model suited to understanding how polarization arises on speci c issues. Formally, we de ne polarization as the variance of a given set of opinions.
De nition 2.1 (Polarization, P z ). For a vector of n opinions z ∈ [-1, 1] n , let mean(z) = 1 n n j=1 z j be the mean opinion in z.
P z ranges between 0 when all opinions are equal and n when half of the opinions in z equal 1 and half equal -1. P z was rst proposed as a measure of polarization in [49] , and has since been used in other recent work studying polarization in FJ dynamics [18, 52] . While we focus on De nition 2.1, we refer the interested reader to [33] for discussion of alternative measures of polarization.
Under the FJ model, the polarization of the equilibrium set of opinions has a simple closed form. In particular, let s = s -1 · mean(s) be the mean centered set of innate opinions on a topic, and de ne z similarly. Using that 1 is in the null-space of any graph Laplacian L, it is easy to check (see [52] for details) that mean(z) = mean(s) and thus z * = (L + I ) -1 s. It follows that:
In addition to polarization, we de ne two other quantities of interest involving opinions in a social network. Both have appeared repeatedly in studies involving the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics [2, 18, 52] .
The rst quantity measures how much node i's opinion di ers from those of its neighbors.
De nition 2.2 (Local Disagreement, D G,z,i ). For i ∈ 1, . . . , n, a vector of opinions z ∈ [-1, 1] n , and social network graph G,
We also de ne an aggregate measure of disagreement.
De nition 2.3 (Global Disagreement, D G,z ). For a vector of opinions z ∈ [-1, 1] n , and social network graph G,
The factor of 1/2 is included so that each edge (i, j) is only counted once. When G has graph Laplacian L, it can be checked (see e.g. [52] ) that D G,z = z T Lz = z T Lz.
Disagreement measures how misaligned each node's opinion is with the opinions of its neighbors. We are also interested in how misaligned a node's expressed opinion is with its innate opinion.
De nition 2.4 (Local Internal Con ict, I z,s,i ). For i ∈ 1, . . . , n, a vector of expressed opinions z ∈ [-1, 1] n , and a vector of innate opinions s ∈ [-1, 1] n ,
We also de ne an aggregate measure of internal con ict.
De nition 2.5 (Global Internal Con ict, I z,s ). For a vector of expressed opinions z ∈ [-1, 1] n , and a vector of innate opinions
Since mean(z) = mean(s), we equivalently have I z,s = z -s 2 2 .
We can rewrite both the Friedkin-Johnsen update rule and equilibrium opinion vector as solutions to optimization problems involving minimizing disagreement and internal con ict.
Claim 2.1. The Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics update rule (Equation 1) is equivalent to
The equilibrium opinion vector z * (Equation 3 ) is equivalent to
It was also observed in [18] that polarization, disagreement, and internal con ict obey a "conservation law" in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics.
Claim 2.2 (Conservation law).
For any network graph G with Laplacian L, innate opinions s ∈ [-1, 1] n , and equilibrium opinions z * = (L + I ) -1 s,
Now, combining Equations (6) and (7) tells us that z * , the equilibrium solution of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, maximizes polarization plus disagreement.
Now suppose we add another actor, whose goal is to minimize disagreement, to the model. Informally, since the users of the network are maximizing polarization + disagreement, and this other actor is minimizing disagreement, one would expect polarization to increase. This intuitive observation motivates the network administrator dynamics, described below, as a vehicle for the emergence of lter bubbles in a network.
The Emergence of Filter Bubbles
We introduce another actor to the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics, the network administrator. The network administrator increases user engagement via personalized ltering, or showing users content that they are more likely to agree with. In the Friedkin-Johnsen model, this corresponds to the network administrator reducing disagreement by making changes to the edge weights of the graph (e.g. users see more content from users with similar opinions, and less content from users with very di erent opinions).
Network Administrator Dynamics
Formally, our extension of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics has two actors: users, who change their expressed opinions z, and a network administrator, who changes the graph G. The network administrator dynamics are as follows.
Network Administrator Dynamics.
Given initial graph G (0) = G and initial opinions z (0) = s, in each round r = 1, 2, 3, . . .
• First, the users adopt new expressed opinions z (r) . These opinions are the equilibrium opinions (Equation 3) of the FJ dynamics model applied to G (r-1) :
Here L (r-1) is the Laplacian of G (r-1) .
• Then, given user opinions z (r) , the network administrator minimizes disagreement by modifying the graph, subject to certain restrictions:
S is the constrained set of graphs the network administrator is allowed to change to.
Restricting changes to the graph
S, the set of all graphs the network admin can modify the graph to (Equation 20), should re ect realistic changes that a recommender system would make. For example, if the network admin is unconstrained, then the network admin will simply set w ij = 0 for all edges (i, j), as the empty graph minimizes disagreement. This is entirely unrealistic, however, as a social network would never eliminate all connections between users. In our experiments, we de ne S as follows:
Constraints on the network administrator. Given > 0 and initial graph G with adjacency matrix W , let S contain all graphs with adjacency matrix W satisfying:
2. j W ij = j (W ) ij for all i, i.e. the degree of each vertex should not change.
The rst constraint prevents the network administrator from making large changes to the initial graph W . Here, represents an L 2 constraint parameter for how much the network administrator can change edge weight in the network. The second constraint restricts the network administrator to only making changes that maintain the total level of interaction for every user. Otherwise, the network administrator would reduce disagreement by decreasing the total amount of edge weight in the graph-corresponding to having people spend less time on the network-which is not realistic.
Note that, since S gives a convex set over adjacency matrices and D G,z (r) is a convex function (as a function of the adjacency matrix of G), the minimization problem in Equation (20) has a unique solution, eliminating any ambiguity for the network administrator.
Convergence
Although it is not immediately obvious, the Network Administrator Dynamics do converge. In each round, the users are minimizing disagreement + internal con ict (Equation 6), while the network admin is minimizing disagreement (Equation 20 ). Thus, we can view the Network Administrator Dynamics as alternating minimization on disagreement + internal con ict:
arg min
While D G,z + I z,s is not convex in both z and W , it is convex in one variable when the other is xed. Because our constraints on W are also convex, alternating minimization will converge to a stationary point of D G,z + I z,s [9, 10] . Moreover, while the convergence point is not guaranteed to be the global minima of D G,z + I z,s , we empirically nd that alternating minimization converges to a better solution than well-known optimization methods such as sequential quadratic programming [13] and DMCP [57] .
Experiments
Using two real-world networks, we show that content ltering by the network administrator greatly increases polarization. Datasets. We use two real-world networks collected in [24] , which were previously used to study polarization in [52] . We brie y describe the datasets. More details can be found in [24, 52] .
Twitter is a network with n = 548 nodes and m = 3638 edges. Edges correspond to user interactions. The network depicts the debate over the Delhi legislative assembly elections of 2013.
Reddit is a network with n = 556 nodes and m = 8969 edges. Nodes are users who posted in the politics subreddit, and there is an edge between two users if there exist two subreddits (other than politics) that both users posted in during the given time period.
In both networks, each user has multiple opinions associated to them, obtained via sentiment analysis on multiple posts. Similar to [52] , we average each of these opinions to obtain an equilibrium expressed opinion z * i for each user i. Inverting Equation (3) yields innate opinions s = (L+I )z, which we clamp to [-1, 1] . This yields a rough estimate of the innate opinions of each user, and provides a starting point for analyzing the dynamics of polarization.
Results. Figure 2 shows our results applying the network administrator dynamics to the Reddit and Twitter datasets. For both networks, we calculate the increase in polarization after introducing the network administrator dynamics, relative to the polarization of the equilibrium opinions without the network administrator. We plot this polarization increase versus , the L 2 parameter that speci es how much the network administrator can change the network. We also plot the increase in disagreement versus .
Once is large enough, polarization rises greatly in both networks. For example, when = 0.5, polarization increases by a factor of around 700× in the Reddit network, and a factor of around 60× in the Twitter network. While polarization increases in both networks, it is interesting to observe that the Twitter network is more resilient than the Reddit network. Surprisingly, for < 0.7, disagreement also increases in the Reddit network-so the network administrator does not even accomplish its goal of reducing disagreement.
Overall, our experiments illustrate how recommender systems can greatly increase opinion polarization in social networks, and give experimental credence to the theory of lter bubbles [54] .
Fragile Consensus in Social Network Graphs
Our results in Section 3 establish that polarization in Friedkin-Johnsen opinion models can signi cantly increase even when the network administrator adjusts just a small amount of edge weight.
To better understand this empirical nding, we present a theoretical analysis of the sensitivity of social networks to outside in uence. In this work we are most interested in the e ect of " ltering" by a network administrator, but our analysis can also be applied to potential in uence from advertisers [35, 43] or propaganda [16] . We want to understand how easily such outside in uence can a ect the polarization of a network.
The Stochastic Block Model
We consider a common generative model for networks that can lead to polarization: the stochastic block model (SBM) [39] .
De nition 4.1 (Stochastic Block Model (SBM)). The stochastic block model is a random graph model parametrized by n, the size of the communities, and p, q, the edge probabilities. The model generates a graph G with 2n vertices, where the vertex set of G, V = {v 1 , . . . , v 2n }, is partitioned into two sets or "communities", S = {v 1 , . . . , v n } and T = {v n+1 , . . . , v 2n }. Edges are generated as follows. For all v i , v j ∈ V :
• If v i , v j ∈ S or v i , v j ∈ T , set w ij = 1 with probability p, and w ij = 0 otherwise.
• If v i ∈ S, v j ∈ T or v i ∈ T , v j ∈ S, set w ij = 1 with probability q, and w ij = 0 otherwise. Also known as "planted partition model", the stochastic block model has as long history of study in statistics, machine learning, theoretical computer science, statistical physics, and a number of other areas. It has been used to study social dynamics, suggesting it as a natural choice for analyzing the dynamics of polarization [8, 48] . We refer the reader to the survey in [1] for a complete discussion of applications and prior theoretical work on the model.
There are many possible variations on De nition 4.1. For example, S and T may di er in size or V may be partitioned into more than two communities. Our speci c setup is both simple and well-suited to studying the dynamics of opinions with two poles, as in the Friedkin-Johnsen model.
Opinion Dynamics in the SBM
As in most work on the SBM, we consider the natural setting where q < p, i.e. the probability of two nodes being connected is higher when the nodes are in the same community, and lower when they are in di erent communities. This setting results in a graph G which is "partitioned": G looks like two identically distributed Erdős-Rényi random graphs, connected by a small number of random edges.
We assume the nodes in S have innate opinions clustered near -1 (one end of the opinion spectrum), and the nodes in T have innate opinions clustered near 1, so that nodes with similar innate opinions are more likely to be connected by edges. This property, known as "homophily", is commonly observed in real-world social networks [21] . Homophily arises because innate opinions are often correlated with demographics like age, geographic location, and education level-demographics that in uence the probability of two nodes being connected.
With the SBM chosen as a model for graphs which resemble real-world social networks, this section's main question is:
How sensitive is the equilibrium polarization of a Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics to changes in the underlying social network graph G, when G is generated from a SBM?
To answer this question, we analyze how the equilibrium polarization of SBM networks depends on parameters p and q. We show that polarization of the equilibrium opinions decreases quadratically with q, which means that even networks with very few edges between S and T have low polarization.
Formally, let A ∈ R 2n×2n , D = diag(rowsum(A)), and L = D -A, be the adjacency matrix, diagonal degree matrix, and Laplacian, respectively, of a graph G drawn from the stochastic block model. For simplicity, assume the FJ dynamics with s set to completely polarized opinions, which perfectly correlate with a node v i 's membership in either S = {v 1 , . . . v n } or T = {v n+1 . . . v 2n }:
Our main result is below.
Theorem 4.1 (Fragile consensus in SBM networks). Let G be a graph generated by the SBM with 1/n ≤ q ≤ p and p > c log 4 n/n for some universal constant c. Let s be the innate opinion vector de ned in Equation (12), and let v * be the equilibrium opinion vector according to the FJ dynamics. Then for su ciently large n,
with probability 97/100, for universal constants C, C .
Note that our assumptions on q and p are mild -we simply need that, in expectation, each node has at least one connection outside of its home community, and O(log 4 n) connections within its home community. In real-world social networks, the average number of connections typically exceeds these minimum requirements. Figure 3 : The equilibirum polarization of a SBM social network plotted as a function of nq, i.e. the average number of "out-of-group" edges in the network per node. Polarization falls rapidly with nq, leading to a state of potentially fragile consensus, where removing a small number of edges from a network can vastly increase polarization.
Remarks. Theorem 4.1 leads to two important observations. First, with high probability, the equilibrium polarization of a SBM network is independent of p, the probability of generating an "in-group" edge. This is highly counterintuitive: one would expect that increasing p would decrease polarization, as each node would be surrounded by a larger proportion of like-minded nodes.
Second, when nq is su ciently large, polarization scales as ∼ 2n (2nq) 2 . Since the maximum polarization in a network with 2n nodes is 2n, this says that the polarization of an SBM graph drops quadratically with nq, the expected number of "out-of-group" edges per node. This behavior is visualized in Figure 3 .
The second observation suggests an interesting view about social networks that are relatively un-polarized (i.e., are near consensus). In particular, it is possible for such networks to be in a state of fragile consensus, meaning that if small number of edges are removed between S and T -for example by a network administrator -then polarization will rapidly increase. This is the case even when edges between S and T are eliminated randomly, as eliminating edges randomly produces a new G also drawn from an SBM, but with parameter q < q. Referring to Figure 3 and Theorem 4.1, G can have signi cantly higher polarization than G, even when q is close to q.
Expectation Analysis
To prove Theorem 4.1, we apply McSherry's "perturbation" approach for analyzing the stochastic block model [51, 60] . We rst bound the polarization of an SBM graph in expectation, and then show that the bound carries over to random SBM graphs. 
Let s, as de ned in Equation (12), be the innate opinion vector for the network, and let w * be the resulting equilibrium opinion vector according to the FJ dynamics. Then,
Proof. Let D and L be the diagonal degree matrix and Laplacian of G, respectively. Since s is mean centered, we have that
To analyze P w * , we need to obtain an explicit representation for the eigendecomposition of (L + I ) -2 . Let U = [u (1) , u (2) ] where
s. We can check that A + pI = U ΛU T where Λ = diag(n(p + q), n(p -q)). Now, let U = [u (1) , u (2) , Z] ∈ R 2n×2n where Z ∈ R 2n×(2n-2) is a matrix with orthonormal columns satisfying Z T u (1) = 0 and Z T u (2) = 0. Such a Z can be obtained by extending u (1) , u (2) to an orthonormal basis. Note that U is orthogonal, i.e.
, we see that
where
, we have that s is orthogonal to u (1) and the columns of Z. Thus,
Perturbation Analysis
With the proof of Lemma 4.2 in place, we prove Theorem 4.1 by appealing to the following standard result on matrix concentration. There exists a universal constant c such that if p ≥ c log 4 n/n, then with probability 99/100,
We also require a standard Bernstein inequality (see e.g. [63] ): Using these two bounds, we rst prove the following lemma. Note that when p ≥ c log 4 n, c 0 pn log n ≤ c0 √ c log 1.5 n · pn, so for su ciently large n, this lemma implies that L -L 2 ≤ 1 2 pn.
Proof. Let D be the degree matrix of G and recall that
ii is a sum of Bernoulli random variables with total variance σ 2 upper bounded by 2np. It follows from Lemma 4.4 and our assumption that p = Ω(1/n) that for any i, |D ii -D ii | ≤ c 1 pn log n with probability 1 -1 200n for a xed universal constant c 1 . By a union bound, we have that max i |D ii -D ii | ≤ pn log n with probability 99/100 for all i. A second union bound with the event that A -A 2 < 3 √ pn
gives the lemma with c 0 = 3 + c 1 .
With Lemma 4.5 in place, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We separately consider two cases.
Case 1, q ≥ p/2. In this setting, all eigenvalues of L + I lie between pn + 1 and 1.5pn + 1, except for the smallest eigenvalue of 1, which has corresponding eigenvector u (1) = 1/ √ 2n. Since Lu (1) = 0, u (1) is also an eigenvector of L + I . Let P = u (1) u (1)T be a projection onto this eigenvector. Using that u (1) is an eigenvalue of both L and L and applying Lemma 4.5, we have:
(0.5pn + 1) (I -P) (I -P)(L + I )(I -P) (2pn + 1)(I -P).
Since (I -P)(L + I )(I -P) and (I -P) commute, it follows that (0.5pn + 1) 2 (I -P) (I -P)(L + I ) 2 (I -P) (2pn + 1) 2 (I -P). Finally, noting that (I -P)s = s, s T s = 2n, and M N ⇒ N -1 M -1 gives the Theorem for q ≥ p/2.
Case 2, q < p/2. The small q case is more challenging, requiring a strengthening of Lemma 4.5. Lemma 4.5 asserts that every eigenvalue of L is within additive error c 0 pn log n from the corresponding eigenvalue in L. While strong for L's largest eigenvalues of (p + q)n, the statement can be weak for L's smallest non-zero eigenvalue of 2nq. We require a tighter relative error bound, which we show in the lemma below.
Lemma 4.6. Assume 1/n ≤ q < p/2. Let λ 2 (L) be L's smallest non-zero eigenvalue. With probability 99/100, for su ciently large n,
Before proving Lemma 4.6, we use it to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1. To do so, we require the following well-known bound. 
Continuing the proof of Theorem 4.1, let P = u (1) u (1)T . LetŨ ∈ R 2n×(2n-1) be an orthonormal basis for the span of I -P. We will apply Lemma 4.7 to the matricesŨ T LŨ andŨ T LŨ . Since u (1) is an eigenvector of both L and L, the eigenvectors of U T LŨ andŨ T LŨ are equal to the remaining 2n -1 eigenvectors of L and L left multiplied byŨ T . The eigenvalues ofŨ T LŨ andŨ T LŨ are simply the non-zero eigenvalues of L and L.
Let y be the eigenvector of L associated with λ 2 (L). Theorem 4.5 implies that Ũ T LŨ -Ũ T LŨ ≤ c 0 pn log n and so by Lemma 4.7, we have:
Since p -q ≥ p/2, our assumption that p = Ω(log 4 n/n) implies that (u (2)TŨ TŨ y) 2 ≥ 1-O(1/ log 3 n)), which is ≥ 1/2 for large enough n. Since y and u (2) are eigenvalues of L and L respectively, both are orthogonal to u (1) . So (u (2)TŨ TŨ y) 2 = (u (2)T y) 2 . We conclude:
In other words, L's second eigenvector y has a large inner product with L's second eigenvector u (2) . Since L and (L + I ) -2 have the same eigenvectors, we can bound
as follows:
where All we have left is to prove Lemma 4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We will rst prove that
To do so, we apply the Courant-Fischer minmax theorem, from which is su ces to exhibit two orthogonal unit vectors with Rayleigh quotient ≤ 4nq. The rst will be u (1) = 1/ √ 2n, which has Rayleigh quotient u (1)T Lu (1) = 0. The second will be u (2) = s/ √ 2n, which is orthogonal to u (1) . Let γ = u (2)T Lu (2) . We can check that 2nγ is exactly equal to the number of entries in the o diagonal n × n blocks of A -i.e. it is twice the number of edges in G between di erent communities. Appealing to Lemma 4.4, we have that |2n 2 q -2nγ| ≤ 11n √ q with probability 99/100 as long as q > 1/n. So for large enough n,
which proves (16). Next we establish that
Again we apply the minmax principle, this time exhibiting 2n -1 vectors with Rayleigh quotient ≥ 1 2 nq. The rst vector will be u (2) , which we know has su ciently large Rayleigh quotient by (17) . For the remaining vectors, let z 1 , . . . , z 2n-2 ∈ R 2n be a set of 2n -2 orthonormal vectors which are orthogonal to both u (1) and u (2) .
From (15), we can derive that for any i, (z T i y) 2 ≤ 1/2, where y is the eigenvector corresponding to L's second smallest eigenvalue. Since all other eigenvalues of L are ≥ 1 2 pn, we thus have, for all i,
This proves (18) , which along with (16) gives the Lemma.
A Simple Remedy
Throughout this paper, our results have largely been pessimistic. When we introduce the network administrator, an external actor who lters content for users, we see that polarization rises and echo chambers form, along the lines of Pariser's lter bubble theory [54] . Our analysis in the SBM further evidences that social networks can easily be in a state of "fragile consensus", which leaves them vulnerable to become extremely polarized even when only a small number of edges are modi ed. In this section, however, we conclude with a positive result. We nd that, with a slight modi cation to the network administrator dynamics, the lter bubble e ect is vastly mitigated. Even more surprisingly, disagreement also barely increases, showing that it is possible for the network administrator to reduce polarization in the network while not hurting its own objective. 
Regularized Dynamics
We modify the role of the network administrator by adding an L 2 regularization term to its objective function.
Regularized Network Administrator Dynamics. Given initial graph G (0) = G and initial opinions z (0) = s, in each round r = 1, 2, 3, . . .
S is the constrained set of graphs the network administrator is allowed to change to, W is the adjacency matrix of G, and γ > 0 is a xed constant.
γ > 0 is a xed constant that controls the strength of regularization. We use L 2 regularization because arg min
x: x 1=1
x 2 = 1 n /n for x ∈ R n . So intuitively, since the network administrator must keep the total edge weight of the graph constant, the addition of the regularization term encourages the network administrator to make modi cations to many edges in the graph, instead of making large, concentrated changes to a small number of edges. Figure 4 shows the results of the regularized network administrator dynamics on the Reddit and Twitter networks, with γ = 0.2. Polarization increases by at most 4%, no matter the value of . This is a drastic di erence from the non-regularized network administrator dynamics, where polarization increased by over 4000%. Disagreement, which the network administrator is incentivized to decrease, increases by at most 5%.
Results

Conclusion and Future Directions
Social media has become an integral part of our lives, with a majority of people using at least one social media app daily [58] . Despite enabling users access to a diversity of information, social media usage has been linked to increased societal polarization [30] . One popular theory to explain this phenomenon is the idea of lter bubbles: by automatically recommending content that a user is likely to agree with (i.e. content ltering), social network algorithms create polarized "echo chambers" of users [54] . While intellectually satisfying, evidence for the lter bubble theory is mainly post-hoc, and the theory has been met with skepticism [7, 14, 41, 53, 61, 64] . In this work, we propose an extension to the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model that explicitly models recommendation systems in social networks. Using this model, we experimentally show the emergence of lter bubbles in real-world networks. We also provide theoretical justi cation for why social networks are so vulnerable to outside actors.
Our work poses many follow-up questions. For example, as discussed earlier, variants of the Bounded Con dence Model (BCM) have previously been used to argue that polarization is caused by "biased assimilation" of content by users [21, 26, 34] . In this work, we use the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model because of its linear algebraic interpretation, which allows us to establish concrete theoretical results. An interesting follow-up would be to incorporate our network administrator dynamics into the more complex BCM variants used by [34] and [26] .
Another interesting direction is modeling the interference of other outside actors, as our theoretical analysis is not limited to recommendation systems. Can we develop a similar framework for modeling the e ects of cyber warfare (see e.g. [55] ) on societal polarization? And perhaps more importantly, can we also develop methods to mitigate the e ects of cyber warfare on polarization?
